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Prospects for Human Rights Advocacy in
the Wake of September 11, 2001
Juan E. M6ndez* & Javier Mariezcurrena**
"All told, more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested
in many countries. Many others have met a different fate. Let's
put it this way-they are no longer a problem to the United States
and our friends and allies. (Applause)"1
Introduction
More than two years after the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington, there is now more clarity about what to expect of
their effects on the struggle for human rights worldwide. We are
immersed in a "war-without-end against terrorism,"2 which
includes an assault on international human rights law. This
assault is sometimes rhetorical, but it also includes specific
policies and practices that threaten to undermine the normative
and ethical bases of the human rights movement.3 Within the
United States and allied countries, we witness the weakening of
legal safeguards for the exercise of civil liberties, as well as some
more flagrant violations of individual human rights.4 We run the
clear risk of a permanent erosion of basic norms on personal
liberty, due process, personal integrity, and even the right to life.5
* Juan E. M6ndez is a Professor of Law and Director, Center for Civil and
Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School, Indiana, United States of America.
** Javier Mariezcurrena, an attorney, is a candidate in the Master's of Law
program (LL.M.) in Human Rights, also at Notre Dame, and Project Manager of the
Transitional Justice project of the CCHR. An earlier version of this paper was
presented in Spanish at the Grupo de Reflexi6n Regional, Lima, Peru, May 2003.
The authors wish to acknowledge the cooperation of Charles Roberts in translating
that original version into English.
1. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/O1/20030128-19.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2004).
2. Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 22. See Floyd J. McKay, 9-11 is No Reason to Suspend the
Constitution, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at B7.
3. Infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
4. Infra notes 113-128 and accompanying text.
5. For an analysis of the United States response with regard to International
Law and Inequality
In international relations, major pressure is brought to bear
on the United Nations and various governments, perhaps as never
before, to attain the aims of the current United States
administration.6  Different reactions to the phenomenon of
terrorism cause the United States government to apply a
Manichean logic of friend or foe, in a discourse that is
contemptuous of governments that oppose more the means than
the ends of the anti-terrorist campaign, such as those of the "old
Europe."7 The projection of United States power abroad carries
with it all kind of threats, from conducting two wars at once to
cutting economic assistance.8 The unilateral use of force against
Iraq caused a major division among the permanent members of
the Security Council: China, Russia, and France, on the one hand;
the United States and United Kingdom on the other.9 The case of
France is symptomatic, because, along with Germany (which also
opposed United States designs in Iraq), it is an important partner
in the Western alliance.' 0  The "unilateralism""l and
"exceptionalism"' 2 that mark United States foreign policy are the
most recent and most important threats to the future of
international human rights law. 13
Those who defend Washington's policy will protest that
unilateralism and exceptionalism do not make the United States
government an enemy of human rights. To the contrary, they will
argue, taking military intervention to places where the most
fundamental rights are denied and which also pose a threat to
their neighbors, is the most effective way to promote democracy
Human Rights Law see Douglass Cassel, International Human Rights and the
United States Response to 11 September, in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE (C. Fijnaut et
al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004, forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 251,
on file with author).
6. Infra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
7. Reda Benkirane, Editorial Analysis: The Cultural Dimension of the Current
Crisis, World Council of Churches, Feb. 14, 2002, at http://www.wcc-
coe.org/wcc/behindthenews (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
8. Infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
9. Julia Preston, Threats and Responses: Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003,
at A16.
10. Richard Bernstein, Bush Visit Will Lift Poland to Status of Special Friend,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at All.
11. See Geoffrey Wheatcroft, A Superpower Goes Its Own Way, at its Peril, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2003, at E6 (reviewing CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION:
AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF GOOD INTENTIONS (2003)).
12. See William Safire, The Way We Live Now, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 24 (describing "exceptionalism" as setting one's own philosophy
"apart from comparison with others").
13. Infra notes 69-139 and accompanying text.
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and the values of human rights worldwide. 14 Strictly speaking, the
Bush administration has not publicly announced that human
rights would be of less concern than terrorism (as the Reagan
administration did, through his first secretary of state, Alexander
Haig).15 Nonetheless, Bush's statement quoted in the epigraph of
this essay16 symbolizes, in our view, his administration's attitude
on the subject: that assassinating external enemies has ceased to
be taboo in Washington. This fact also reflects a permissive
position with respect to policies and practices that violate the
essence of human rights as restrictions on the means by which
power is exercised, no matter how compelling the ends.17
In contrast, it is encouraging to see the efforts of some states
that support the "war on terrorism"18 while insisting on respect for
both basic human rights and international humanitarian law
standards. 9  There is also room for optimism because of
pronouncements by international organizations and actions by
civil society organizations that represent an organized and
coherent response to the attack on human rights that underlies
the best-known expressions of the "war on terrorism."2 Similarly
hopeful expressions have been the peace demonstrations held
practically everywhere in the world, especially in societies which,
along with their governments, consider the war as the worst of
evils.21 Even among the Bush administration's allies (United
Kingdom, Italy, and Spain) majoritarian public opinion markedly
opposes the policies of their governments.2 2 The same is true of
14. Patrick E. Tyler, Blair Tells Commons That Results in Iraq Are More
Important Than Faulty Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at A15.
15. Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF.
1066, 1069 (1986); Neil C. Livingstone, Terrorism: Conspiracy, Myth and Reality,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1998, at 1, 2.
16. Bush, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 112-127 and accompanying text (arguing that certain United
States policies violate human rights).
18. Terror Fight on G.O.P. List for Election, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at A26.
19. The first major difference between the United States and other Western
powers, in this case with France and Great Britain, in relation to the campaign in
Afghanistan, was the denial of the legal status of prisoners of war guaranteed by
the third Geneva Convention of 1949 to the detainees transferred to the military
base at Guantfinamo. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON Q.C., CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 495 (2d ed. 2002); Thom Shanker
& Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002,
at A12.
20. Infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
21. Alan Cowell, 1.5 Million Demonstrators in Cities Across Europe Oppose a War
Against Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 1 (Magazine), at 20.
22. Lizette Alvarez, Blair, in Surprise Return to Basra, Praises Efforts by Troops,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at All; Frank Bruni, Thousands of Italians in Tribute to
Law and Inequality
broad segments of the U.S. public.23
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq pose major dilemmas to
the human rights movement, especially due to its normative
reliance on a set of principles that are an integral part of
international law. The military actions of the United States and
its allies in both conflicts constitute a new and radical
conceptualization of the legitimacy of the use of force in
international relations. 24  Some practices carried out in those
conflicts, moreover, are radical reinterpretations of the
international law of armed conflicts and are against previously
well-settled policies and practices of the United States.25 Should
these regressive trends be affirmed, the legal foundation of human
rights work will be seriously called into question. Though
ultimately the basis of the human rights movement is a
universally shared set of ethics, the possible fragility of
peremptory legal norms would deprive us of important aims, such
as the objective basis and the critical standard by which to judge
the conduct of states.
This is the framework, simplified in the extreme, in which
this Essay debates the prospects for the work of the human rights
movement. Two clarifications are in order. First, this is being
written just as the so-called war on terrorism is unfolding, at a
moment when the conflict is escalating at full throttle, thus it is
not possible to see the top or what lies beyond. Second, this Essay
is directly related to the development of international political
events. In addition to our inherent personal limitations,
forecasting such events is always risky. As has been noted, after
all, the "[slocial science utterly failed to predict virtually all of the
most momentous developments of our century, from the rise of
fascism and the gulag to the .. .demise of communism." 26 With
the 19 Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at A12; John Tagliabue, A Region Inflamed:
Madrid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at A13; see also Cowell, supra note 21; Alan
Cowell, Around the World, Thousands Protest the War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003,
at Bi; Richard W. Stevenson, Antiwar Protest Fail to Sway Bush Plans for Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, § 1 (Magazine), at 1; Fawn Vrazo & Daniel Rubin,
Bush's Image in Europe Takes a Negative Turn, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 24, 2003,
available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/5253268.htm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2004).
23. Leslie Eaton, On New York's Streets and Across the Nation, Protestors Speak
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at A14; Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Support
for Bush Surges at Home, but Split Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, § 1
(Magazine), at 1; Patrick E. Tyler & Janet Elder, Poll Shows Most in U.S. Support
Delaying War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, § 1 (Magazine), at 1.
24. Infra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
25. Infra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
26. MARK OSIEL, MASS ATRocITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAw ix (1997).
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this, we wish to highlight that while there is greater clarity in
some respects, the most important characteristic of the current
moment is uncertainty. This factor should be borne in mind when
it comes to proposing, discussing, and implementing lines of
action. The starting point for our exploration of the prospects for
human rights work will be a characterization of certain aspects of
the foreign and domestic human rights policy of the United
States,27 to be followed by an analysis of the importance of these
responses within and for the human rights movement 2 8 and the
challenges they pose. Finally, some ideas for possible actions or
strategies that may help improve the current situation, or at least
limit its most pernicious effects, will be suggested.29
I. United States Human Rights Policy In A Unipolar
World
A. The Inclusion of Human Rights in United States
Foreign Policy
It is commonly accepted that the interest and initiative of the
United States Congress for a more active human rights based
foreign policy came about as a response to Vietnam, due to
disillusion with the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford foreign policy, and
pressure from the United States civil rights movement.30 With the
election of President Carter, human rights were institutionalized
as an element of United States foreign policy.3 1 While in his
inaugural address President Carter argued that the commitment
to human rights should be absolute, it was in his June 1977 speech
at the University of Notre Dame that he spelled out in greater
detail and presented his principles on foreign policy and human
rights to the United States public.3 2
27. Infra notes 30-160 and accompanying text.
28. Infra notes 161-190 and accompanying text.
29. Infra notes 192-198 and accompanying text.
30. David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights:
Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205,
206 n.2 (1985).
31. Id. at 214.
32. Hauke Hartmann, U.S. Human Rights Policy Under Carter and Reagan,
1977-1981, 23 HUM. RTs. Q., 402, 405 (2001). Among other statements, then-
President Carter said:
Because we know that democracy works, we can reject the arguments of
those rulers who deny human rights to their people .... [T]hroughout the
world today, in free nations and in totalitarian countries as well, there is a
preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights. And I
believe it is incumbent on us in this country to keep that discussion, that
Law and Inequality
Some criticisms have highlighted the ambivalent aspects and
contradictions of the Carter administration when implementing
this policy, for example, that the test of respect for human rights
was not applied consistently to economic aid decisions.13 It has
been argued that human rights were just one additional element of
foreign policy, but not an integral part, and that his leadership
was not sufficient to surmount the rejection or inertia of the
bureaucracy. 34 Methodologically, the case-by-case work towards
which Carter himself was inclined made human rights issues more
a question of personal initiative than institutional policy;
accordingly, the results would vary, depending largely on the work
and commitment of whatever officials happened to be in office. 35
For his part, Reagan leveled harsh criticism at Carter's
foreign policy, first, for supposedly having a double standard, since
he condemned minor violations by regimes friendly to the United
States while ignoring the most important violators, i.e. the
communist countries.3 6 Second, Reagan condemned it for being
ineffective z7 Worse still, according to Reagan and his advisors,
public criticism reduced the real influence and capacity of the
United States to bring pressure to bear on that country, impeding
improvements in the human rights situation.3 The Reagan camp
not only condemned the policy as ineffective, but also as
counterproductive; criticizing a friend of the United States
deprived that friend of legitimacy and weakened him, at a time
when that circumstance could only strengthen opponents who
were generally foes of the United States. 39 Fourth, it was argued
that the human rights policy was contrary to the self-interest of
the United States because weakening imperfect, but at least pro-
debate, that contention alive. No other country is as well-qualified as we
to set an example.
President Jimmy Carter, Commencement Speech at Notre Dame University (June
1977), at http://usinfo.state.gov/usainfousa/facts/democrac/55.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2004).
33. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 30, at 215.
34. See Hartmann, supra note 32, at 416 (describing the regional bureaus of the
State Department's use of "their bureaucratic experience and strength to resist any
fixed obligations").
35. Hartmann, supra note 32, at 417-18; see Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning
U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 246
(1982) ("[The success of implementation will depend on . . . institutional and
personal considerations of the officials concerned.").
36. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 30, at 205.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Id.
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Western, regimes were seen as a threat to American interests.0
Carter's policy was viewed as utopian, overly principled, and
single-issue-oriented.41
In response, Reagan's foreign policy would be realistic and
would be based on two fundamental interests: fighting
international terrorism, as a violation of human rights, and
highlighting the moral difference among political regimes.4 2 Both
operated so as to redirect attention to the Soviet Union and its
bloc.43 Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who became Reagan's ambassador to
the United Nations, expressed the administration's ideology that
support for dictatorships was justified because authoritarian
regimes did not break down all forms of social organization. While
totalitarian regimes interfered in all social institutions (politics,
religion, family, education, and economy), authoritarian regimes
merely meddled in politics.44 For the Reagan administration,
determining who was authoritarian and who was totalitarian was
simple: the authoritarian regimes were aligned with the United
States, and the totalitarian ones with the Soviet Union.4
As has been said, neither of the two positions could be upheld
with solid arguments. 6 The very powerful and feared phantom of
communism was incapable of ending religion in Poland, the (black)
market in Cuba, or the continuation of strong political dissent in
Nicaragua. 47 The same could be said with respect to the virtues of
the non-totalitarian regimes: it is not possible to argue that the
scorched-earth policy of Guatemala was not destroying all social,
family, and economic relations of the thousands of persons who
40. Id. at 205.
41. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 30, at 209.
42. Id. at 209-11.
43. Id. at 211,
44. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENT., Nov.
1979, at 34, 44.
45. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 30, at 210. On this point, former Secretary of
State Alexander Haig said "the 'first imperative' of a human rights policy is to
strengthen the United States, its allies and friends, the main safeguard against
totalitarian aggression" and that "[i]nternational terrorism will take the place of
human rights in our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights." Id.
at 208-10 (citing Excerpts from Haig's Speech on Human Rights and Foreign Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1981, at A6; Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 1981, at
31). Haig repeatedly condemned the Soviet Union for training, financing, and
equipping international terrorists, arguing that there was a relationship between
terrorism, understood as opposition to pro- United States governments, and the
Soviet Union. Id. at 208.
46. Id. at 219-24.
47. Id. at 220.
Law and Inequality
were its victims.48 The consequences of repressive actions by
authoritarian pro-United States governments were enormous.
49
Those governments consistently and grossly overreacted to
whatever harm was done by their opponents.5 0
Beyond its unsustainable rhetoric, in practice the Reagan
administration proposed for Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs a person who was well
known for rejecting an active human rights policy51 When
Congress rejected that nomination, Reagan left the position vacant
for a time, and purportedly sought congressional support to
dismantle the human rights bureau.5 2 His administration fostered
the removal of restrictions on aid to Chile, Argentina, Paraguay,
and Uruguay, and lifted the embargo on arms sales to
Guatemala.53
A study on the relationship between amount of economic aid
and human rights record shows that the Carter administration
was less single-minded than Reagan and his acolytes had
claimed.5 4 Government assistance was interrupted, only partially,
in eight countries of Latin America, in large measure continuing
the policy of economic and military assistance.5 There was a
major difference between rhetoric and practice.5 6 The Democratic
administration did not significantly withdraw military aid from
repressive regimes; it often invoked special powers that would
enable it to keep the aid flowing, alleging that the violations were
not systematic, and arguing that there were improvements.5 7 For
both administrations, however, security interests trumped human
rights concerns when they were seen to clash.58
The foreign policies of Carter and Reagan have been
characterized by the major difference in the rhetoric employed by
each, but also by a marked distinction between the rhetoric and
practice of each administration; the distribution of economic aid
48. Id. at 220; Alan Riding, Guatemalans Tell of Murder of 300, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1982, at A3.
49. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 30, at 220.
50. Id.
51. Hartmann, supra note 32, at 424.
52. Id. at 425.
53. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 30, at 224.
54. Id. at 215.
55. Id. at 215-16.
56. Id. at 216.
57. Id. at 222.
58, Id. at 224.
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was similar.59 Neither administration acted strictly in keeping
with the human rights legislation.0 The decisions on distribution
of economic aid were made with other interests in mind, beyond
human rights.61 Nonetheless, as has been acknowledged, there
was at least one major difference: especially in Latin America and
from the standpoint of the victims, the Carter administration
called international attention to human rights violations, gave
hope to the victims, and mitigated their solitude.62 Reagan offered
no hope whatsoever.63
The same desperation can be expected from the current Bush
administration, judging not only by its actions to date,64 but also
by the fact that veterans of those policies in the Reagan
administration are in key posts in the White House and State
Department today.65 No doubt, the tactical mistake of proclaiming
the end of the human rights policy was not made. 66 Yet the
absence of human rights in foreign policy, beyond the
manipulation to justify the war in Iraq, is significant. Indeed, the
office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights,
Democracy and Labor has been relegated to such an obscure role
that very few people in the media or in the human rights
movement can identify its occupant. 67
59. Id. at 227.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 224.
62. Id. at 226.
63. Id. at 226. On the influence of United States human rights policy, see e.g.,
Aryeh Neier, Presidential Leadership: An Essential Ingredient, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
405 (2002).
64. Infra notes, 30-160 and accompanying text.
65. See David Corn, Elliott Abrams: It's Back, Media Transparency, July 2, 2001,
at http:lwww.mediatransparency.org/people/elliot-abrams.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2004) (Elliot Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, currently Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights and International
Operations for the National Security Council); U.S. Dept. of State, Biography: John
R. Bolton, May 22, 2001, at http://www.state.gov/r/palei/biog/2976pf.htm, (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004) (John Bolton, former Assistant Secretary for International
Organization Affairs at the Department of State, currently Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security); U.S. Dept. of State, Biography:
John Negroponte, Nov. 27, 2002, at http:/lwww.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/4952pf.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (John Negroponte, former Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, currently United State Representative to
the United Nations).
66. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
67. The current Assistant Secretary, Lorne W. Craner, was appointed in June
2001. U.S. Dept. of State, Biography: Lorne W. Craner, June 11, 2001, at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eilbiog/3404pf.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). From
1995 until his appointment, he was the president of the International Republican
Institute. Id. Before 1995, he was Director for Asian Affairs at the National
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Many elements of the "Reagan debates," such as terrorism as
the central concern of foreign policy and the distinction between
totalitarian-enemies and authoritarian-friends,68 have come back
to the discussion today. The Soviet threat to United States
interests, used as a justification in the 1980s, has been replaced
neatly by the terrorist threat to the security of Americans as a
justification for a policy equally disdainful of human rights
principles and values.
B. United States Exceptionalism and International Human
Rights Law
Against the overwhelming trend among the majority of
democracies in the world, the United States has rejected the most
important and recent normative developments of international
human rights law. Two months after his inauguration, President
Bush announced that he would not implement the Kyoto Protocol
on global warming, arguing that the obligations contained in that
instrument were prejudicial to the United States economy, and
focused on the emissions of industrialized countries without
binding developing countries such as China and India.69
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to attribute the responsibility
exclusively to President Bush. The so-called pull-out from the
Kyoto Protocol was approved by the Senate in a 95-0 vote. 70 For its
part, the European Union led the wave of criticism of the United
States position but failed to have it changed. 71
Even more hostile was the attitude towards one of the most
important innovations in international human rights law, the
Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court (ICC). In
December 2000, before stepping down from the presidency,
President Clinton signed the Statute, but did not send it to the
Security Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs.
Id. He has a Master's degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown
University. Id.
68. Supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
69. Alex Kirby, U.S. Facing Climate Isolation, BBC News, (Mar. 29, 2001) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/124944.stm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004); Anger at
US Climate Retreat, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/1248278.stm
(Mar. 29, 2001) (last visited Jan. 26, 2004); Dismay as U.S. Drops Climate Pact,
CNN, (Mar. 29, 2001) at
http://edition.cnn.com/2001[WORLD/europe/italy/O3/29/environment.kyoto/ (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
70. Dismay as U.S. Drops Climate Pact, supra note 69 (reporting Ari Fleischer's
statement that "[gliven the fact that it was voted 95-0 against in the U.S. Senate,
it's a clear sign that there is little support, if any").
71. Supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Senate for ratification.7 2 His reason for signing was that the
United States was in a better position to improve and strengthen
it, as necessary, from within.73 Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, lambasted the signing of
the Rome Statute and welcomed the new administration saying:
Today's action is a blatant attempt by a lame-duck President
to tie the hands of his successor. Well, I have a message for
the outgoing President. This decision will not stand. I will
make reversing this decision, and protecting America's
fighting men and women from the jurisdiction of this
international kangaroo court, one of my highest priorities in
the new Congress. 74
In addition to the pressures during the ratification process,
which included sending envoys from the Pentagon to warn the
governments who ratified the treaty that their military assistance
would be cut off, the day after the entry into force of the Rome
Statute, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld aggressively warned that
the United States would not send forces on future peace missions
if they were not guaranteed absolute immunity from the ICC.75
Two days earlier, the United States had put its threats into action,
vetoing the Security Council resolution that extended the mandate
of the peace mission in Bosnia, sparking criticism from Great
Britain and other allies.7 6 In turn, administration spokespersons
indicated what the new strategy would look like: it would include
(1) seeking a Security Council resolution guaranteeing immunity
for Americans on peacekeeping missions; (2) signing bilateral
agreements on immunity, the so-called "Article-98 agreements;
77
72. See U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs,
Clinton Announces U.S. is Signing International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31,
2000) (stating that President Clinton would not submit the treaty to the Senate for
ratification until concerns were satisfied), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/00123101.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2004).
73. Id.
74. Press Release, Helms on Clinton ICC Signature: This Decision Will Not
Stand (Dec. 31, 2000), cited in Michael P. Scharf, The United States and the
International Criminal Court: A Recommendation for the Bush Administration, 7 J.
I'NTL & COMP. L. 385, 385 (2001).
75. See Thorn Shanker & James Dao, U.S. Might Refuse New Peace Duties
Without Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at Al.
76. Id.
77. These immunity agreements arguably violate the Rome Statute. See Human
Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal
Court, (arguing that agreements guaranteeing immunity violate the Rome Statute
and create a two-tiered system of law) at
http://www.hrworg/campaigns/icc/docs/art98analysis.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2004); AMNESTY INT'L, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: U.S. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN
IMPUNITY FOR GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES, (Aug.
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ensuring that Americans in their territory would not be
transferred to the Court, and (3) making changes in the pacts with
those nations that accept United States soldiers on their soil.78
The Security Council eventually yielded to pressure from the
United States, in order to keep the mission in Bosnia out of
danger, and resolved to give twelve months of immunity to all
cases related to peacekeeping personnel from countries that had
not ratified the Rome Statute.19 The resolution could be renewed
indefinitely by the Security Council. 80
The next strategy was to strengthen the bilateral immunity
agreements s' by using the threat to withdraw military aid to
countries that did not sign them, and, less openly, the threat to
hold back its support for countries that might want to join NATO.82
Actually, the concerns of the current administration became
apparent soon thereafter. The Bush administration revealed to its
European allies that the main reason for seeking immunity was to
protect not only members of the military, but most importantly,
United States political leaders from the jurisdiction of the Court. s3
The argument to reject the ICC on the grounds that it
violates a country's sovereignty is specious, as it deliberately
ignores that the principle of complementarity is a cornerstone of
2002), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc_pdf.nsflIndexflOR400252002ENGLISH$FilellOR400
2502.pdf (arguing that countries who enter into impunity agreements will violate
obligations under Article 86 of the Rome Statute) (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
78. Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
79. Felicity Barringer, U.N. Renews U.S. Peacekeepers' Exemption from
Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2003, at A18.
80. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422
(2002); see Human Rights Watch, Closing the Door to Impunity, Human Rights
Watch Recommendation for renewing Resolution 1422, at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/1422legalpdf.
81. Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield Its Peacekeepers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at Al (reporting that bilateral agreements provide
safeguards to avoid extradition of U.S. citizens once the one year exemption
expires).
82. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Issues Warning to Europeans in Dispute Over New
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at A10; Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid
to Peacekeepers Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at Al (reporting that the
Bush administration warned that nations could lose military assistance if they
become members of the ICC without entering into a bilateral agreement with the
United States); see Coalition For the International Criminal Court, Bilateral
Immunity Agreements: Breakdown of Countries (stating that as of Nov. 24, 2003,
seventy-one countries signed Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the United
States) at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/BIAWaiversWICC24
Nov03.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
83. Elizabeth Becker, On World Court, U.S. Focus Shifts to Shielding Officials,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A4.
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the treaty. It is also a condition for the operation of the ICC,
reinforced with many safeguards written into the treaty.84 In the
diplomatic words of one foreign minister, "democratic, law-abiding
states ... have nothing to fear."85 The other argument about the
special role of the United States in the world is no more than an
unpersuasive claim to exceptionalism and impunity. Under this
perspective, the Court affects this role more than that of any other
nation. The threat to end the peace mission in Bosnia bore little
relationship with the integrity of United States military forces in
peacekeeping missions, since the United States makes a minimal
contribution to the U.N.'s presence in Bosnia.86 Amazingly, the
United States willfully risked a humanitarian nightmare in
Bosnia to make a show of strength based on a bad faith argument.
It should be noted, however, that this policy also received
strong backing from the legislative branch. At the same time,
Congress approved the American Servicemembers' Protection Act,
which blocks United States participation in peacekeeping missions
in countries that have ratified the Statute, cuts military aid to
states that have ratified the treaty unless they promise that they
will not transfer United States citizens to the Court, and
authorizes military actions to free United States citizens and
allied citizens in the custody of the Court.87  This law was
rightfully ridiculed as the "Bomb The Hague Bill."88 In any event,
the active opposition of the United States did not keep ninety-two
countries from ratifying the Rome Statute, nor did it stop the
84. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF, 183/9 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002). See, e.g., id. at arts.
15, 53 (stating as an example, the Prosecutor has discretion not to initiate
investigations or prosecutions if it would not serve the interests of justice); id. at
art. 17 (explaining that there are strict conditions of admissibility of cases binding
on the prosecutor and the Court); id. at arts. 18-19 (explaining that countries that
state a claim to jurisdiction superior to that of the ICC can use a procedure to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court and force termination or deferral of the
proceedings); id. at arts. 18, 19, 54, 57 (stating that a pretrial chamber reviews
prosecutorial actions and rules on such challenges and its decisions are binding on
the prosecutor); id. at art. 72 (stating that the national security interests of
countries are protected through a special procedure).
85. Julia Preston, U.S. Rift With Allies on World Court Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2002, at A6.
86. Paddy Ashdown, Collateral Costs in Fighting a New Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 2002, at A21. In Bosnia the United States collaborated with 46 of the 1,500
persons of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission. Id.
87. See Jamie Mayerfeld, Who Shall Be Judge?: The United States, The
International Criminal Court and Global Enforcement of Human Rights, 25 HuM.
RTS. Q. 93, 95 (2003), (analyzing the United States position and the advisability of
multilateralism in applying international human rights law).
88. ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 528.
Law and Inequality
Court from starting up its operations in March 2003, much sooner
than expected. 9
The current Bush administration also opposed the Protocol to
the Convention Against Torture. In this case, the argument
against adopting the Convention Against Torture was that the
mechanism of international visits provided for should not be
financed from the regular budget of the United Nations, even
though that is how all the treaty-based organs and other
mechanisms are funded, but only by the state parties. 90 The
United States opted to actively oppose it and once again ended up
aligning with China, Iran, and Cuba.91 According to Human
Rights Watch, while the United States position complained of the
possible cost and the incompatibility with constitutional
requirements, Washington's opposition appeared to reflect a
profound aversion to efforts to apply international human rights
law.9 2 As a positive aspect, and in any event as in other cases,
United States hostility did not keep the Protocol from being
overwhelmingly adopted by the majority of democratic countries.
There were one hundred and four votes in favor, eight against, and
thirty-seven abstentions. 93
In general, this administration has attacked human rights
instruments instead of committing to seek possible solutions to the
supposed errors. The pattern of conduct shows that the next step
was to wage a strong campaign against the instruments, using all
types of pressures, including the threat of removing economic aid.9 4
Setting aside momentary and limited exceptions, the policy of
rejecting international human rights law is not new. Fifty years
ago, in 1951, Senator John Bricker, Republican of Ohio, displayed
the same sensitivity as the current administration in response to
89. Human Rights Watch, International Criminal Court a Reality (Apr. 11,
2002), at http:(Ihrw.org/press/2002/O4IiccO4llO2.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004)
(reporting that "[t]he 60th ratification has come after less than four years, sooner
than even the Court's staunchest advocates expected. Diplomats had previously
predicted that it would take eight to ten years to obtain the 60 ratifications").
90. Association for the Prevention of Torture, USA Putting Price on the
Prevention of Torture, at http://www.apt.chlunldoplusa.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2003).
91. See Human Rights Watch, New Treaty Against Torture, at
http://www.hrw.org/un/catll02.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
92. Id.
93. Id.; Human Rights Watch, U.S. Moves to Undermine New Torture Treaty
(Jul. 20, 2004) at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/07/torture-treaty.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2004).
94. See Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers Immunity, supra note 82,
at Al (reporting that the threat to remove military aid included training,
education, and financing for equipment and weaponry).
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another of the most important instruments of international human
rights law, the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights: "my purpose in offering this resolution is to bury the so-
called covenant on human rights so deep that no one holding high
public office will ever dare to attempt its resurrection.""5
An interesting analysis of the content of the Senate hearings
shows that arguments against the ratification of human rights
instruments have not varied substantially in the last fifty years.9 6
Another conclusion this study reaches is that the content of the
treaty is not considered determinant in its ratification.9 7 What is
important is the perception, not the content.9 In general, the
members of the Senate and executive branch staff had not read
the treaties. This has not varied much over the last fifty years.99
These staff members were not familiar with the contents or
objectives of the treaties.10 The staff members' reactions to the
human rights treaties are based on the perception of controversy
they bring, the lack of a large electorate interested in them, and
the lack of presidential support, not on what the document says.101
Even before the 9-11 attacks, in 1997, Thomas Buergenthal,
referring to the United States practice with regards to human
rights treaties, had said: "the U.S. once had a legal system that
was international-law friendly, this is certainly no longer true
today."' 02  Now, the temptation of unilateralism and hostility
95. 97 CONG. REC. 88,263 (1951), quoted in Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David
Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The
Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988); see Louis Henkin,
U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995) (arguing that the reservations, understandings, and
declarations that the United States attaches to ratifications echo the "Bricker
Amendments").
96. See Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 95, at 330 (stating that based on an
analysis of the content, the leading indicator of consistency is that 93.5% of the
arguments in the 1979 hearings were essentially the same as those put forth in
1953).
97. Id. at 334.
98. Id.
99. At the respective press conference, presidential spokesperson Ari Fleischer
was asked whether President Bush had read the Kyoto Protocol that he so
staunchly opposed: Q: "Has he read the treaty?" Mr. Fleischer: "I'm not aware of
anybody in government who reads every page of every treaty except for a very, very
few people. But the President is well aware, of course, of what's in the treaty."
Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/briefings/20010328.html#KyotoTreaty (last
visited Feb. 19, 2003).
100. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 95, at 334.
101. Id.
102. Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 212 (1997).
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towards international law, and especially international human
rights law, is notable and has been reinforced today perhaps as
never before. One would have to ask whether it is a contingent
phenomenon, related to the dominant ideology in the current
administration and therefore passing, or whether this is a longer-
term trend. If one bears history in mind, it might be thought that
it is a question of degree; that despite some notable efforts in the
opposite direction, there is a history of strong rejection of human
rights in different areas of government. 03 That history teaches, in
any event, that such rejection may be more or less enthusiastic
depending on who is in the Executive branch and who controls the
Congress.
C. United States Exceptionalism and the War in Iraq
The fall of the Soviet Union brought not only the end of the
bipolarity associated with the Cold War, but also a profound
economic, political, and military distancing of the United States
from every other center of power in international relations. Over
time, that distance became ever more pronounced. Ten years after
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States is the only
superpower in the world, the most powerful nation in history. In
economic and military terms, and therefore also in political terms,
it is much more powerful, alone, than the sum of several of the
other powerful nations of the world.
Even so, the first reaction of the United States immediately
after the attacks of September 11, 2001, was not to respond as a
humiliated and vengeful superpower, but to seek consensus and
launch several diplomatic initiatives. With good judgment, in
those first weeks Washington took advantage of the marked
solidarity of the rest of the world with its status as victim of
terrorism to shape a broad alliance to defeat it. Examples of this
policy were the effort in the U.N. Security Council to come up with
resolutions identifying these attacks as a threat to the peace and
security of nations, and the pronouncement in similar terms of the
organs of various security treaties to which the United States is a
party.104 Nonetheless, the first tendency towards multilateralism
appeared to have run its course very soon. Only a few traces are
left today. Although the administration sought a Security Council
103. See Cohen, supra note 35, at 246-49 (explaining that entrenched
bureaucracies may resist implementing human rights laws even with sympathetic
administrations such as Carter's).
104. Juan E. M6ndez, Human Rights Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 46 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 377, 387 (2002).
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resolution with regard to Iraq, throughout this process it was clear
that the United States would attack Iraq independent of what the
Security Council might resolve, or even against the veto of some of
the permanent members. Finally, the United States proceeded to
attack Iraq unilaterally, without the approval of the only body
under international law authorized to decide on the use of force. 05
The discourse on Iraq in Washington, New York, and
elsewhere became even more dangerous to the future of human
rights than in 2001 with respect to Afghanistan. Although one
may take issue with the need or advisability of the war against the
Taliban, at least as long as Al Qaeda was operating from Afghan
territory, there was a defensible casus belli, given the need to
destroy a possible center of new terrorist attacks. With respect to
Iraq there was no credible argument on the real threat it might
present, either to its neighbors or the rest of the world. Rather,
Iraq and its regime were contained, to use international relations
terminology, by the devastation of the previous Persian Gulf War,
by international sanctions, and by the inspections to detect
possible weapons of mass destruction.
Accordingly, the aggressiveness of the United States position
adds at least three arguments that are relevant and at the same
time dangerous to the future legitimacy of human rights work.
The first of these addresses the need for "regime change."'10 6 In
Latin America we know all too well that, not so long ago, the
United States arrogated to itself the right to promote regime
change in other countries, by covert or overt means. 07 Nationally
and internationally, however, the language of regime change was
abandoned long ago. The fact that it is being discussed once again,
and without the need for any explanation, at least weakens an
essential principle of the international legal order under which we
live, that of the legal equality of all states, and its corollary, non-
intervention.
105. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 3-4, arts. 39, 42, 48, 51 (establishing
authority of United Nations regarding the use of force).
106. Regime Change: From Building Ties to Saddam to Removing Him from
Power (Sept. 30, 2002), at
http://www.cnn.com/2002USlO9/30/sproject.irq.regime.change/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2004) [hereinafter Regime Change].
107. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, COVERT ACTION IN CHILE
1963-1973 1-56 (Comm. Print 1975), available at
http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp#I.%200verview%20and%2OBackgro
und (last visited Feb. 8, 2004); Documents Reveal U.S. Funding for Chile Coup
(Nov. 13, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ WORLD/americas/ll/13/cia.chile.02/
(last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
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The second ingredient of United States policy that has
possible repercussions for our tasks is the notion of the use of force
as "preventive self-defense."'' 08 This line of argument, postulated
as the right of the United States to use force against Iraq with or
without Security Council resolutions, or even against them. There
are profound implications for what has been understood as
legitimate use of force since 1945, as well as for the future of the
United Nations as guarantor of peace and as a forum for peaceful
dispute settlement.0 9 The "hawks" in the United States propose
that the United Nations is now irrelevant because it is not useful
for accompanying their designs for the rest of the world, when the
test of its relevance should be whether it is capable of preventing
war and promoting peace with justice.
The third worrisome element of the new international reality
is the rhetorical use of democracy and human rights to justify
military action. °10 Clearly, nobody within the human rights
movement wishes to defend the regime of Saddam Hussein against
accusations that it was a dictatorship that practiced torture and
even genocide. Yet it is useful to recall that such conduct was
characteristic of the regime for many years, including when
Saddam Hussein's presence in the Middle East was in the United
States' interest."' In addition, the insistence on "liberating" the
Iraqis from this yoke as an ethical basis for war rings hollow
because it is clearly used to take the place of the reasons invoked
earlier, such as the existence of nuclear arsenals or weapons of
mass destruction. The human rights and democracy rationale was
presented only after those other reasons were shown to be
unprovable.11 2
108. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 15 (2002) (outlining preemption doctrine), available at
http:lwww.whitehouse.govlnsclnss.pdf, (last visited Mar. 12, 2004). For a critique,
see Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 607, 619-20 (2003) (arguing that the N.S.S.'s preemption doctrine
"exponentially" expands the range of preemptive action allowed by the U.N.
Charter).
109. See Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 16, 30-33 (2003) (arguing that the 2003 U.N. votes on Iraq showed the
weakness of international regulation of use of force). But see Franck, supra note
108, at 610-14 (arguing that United States actions acknowledge the power of the
U.N. Charter).
110. Bush, supra note 1.
111. Regime Change, supra note 106.
112. Long before the invasion, the nuclear threat had disappeared from
Washington's rhetoric, when it was shown to be based on an outright falsification.
See Seymour M. Hersh, Who Lied to Whom?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2003, at 42-43
(describing consensus that claims regarding Iraq seeking uranium were fabricated).
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The erosion of these organizing principles of the international
legal order looms as a threat, as well, to the very doctrine of
human rights. This is so because the moral and political
legitimacy of the human rights movement stems from an ethic
shared by all cultures, and enshrined in legally binding
instruments. The norms contained in human rights instruments,
though based on principles that predate the State and therefore
also predate the community of states, are an integral part of the
legal architecture enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
Accordingly, principles de-legitimizing non-intervention and
limitations on the use of force can also undercut the legitimacy of
human rights.
D. Exceptionalism at Home: The Erosion of Public Liberties
in the United States
Within the United States, the current administration,
arguing that the situation is exceptional, reacted to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, by sharply eroding public liberties. In recent
reports, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) has
documented and analyzed the government's reaction to the
attacks.113 As indicated in the first of the series:
Viewed separately, some of these changes may not seem
extreme, especially when seen as a response to the September
attacks. But when you connect the dots, a different picture
emerges. The composite picture outlined by this report shows
that too often the U.S. government's mode of operations since
September 11 has been at odds with core American and
international human rights principles.114
In terms of the transparency of the government, the report
shows the major trend toward secrecy in the conduct of public
affairs. Beyond not revealing even the names or number of the
detainees after the attacks, the Bush administration has refused
to give information to the public, the Congress, and the federal
courts in several areas, and has restricted federal laws that
guaranteed the transparency and integrity of government acts,
such as the Freedom of Information Act and the Whistleblower
Protection Act.15
113. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY
AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES i-v (2003); LAWYERS
COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., IMBALANCE OF POWERS: How CHANGES TO U.S. LAW AND
POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES i-viii (2003);
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., A YEAR OF LOSS: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES
SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 i-v (2002) [hereinafter A YEAR OF LOSS].
114. A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 113, at iv.
115. Id. at i-v, 1-5, 19-21.
Law and Inequality
The report also shows the erosion of privacy rights since
September 11th. The USA PATRIOT Act' 6 is a statute that,
among many other things, allows federal agents secretly to enter
homes and workplaces."' In summary, police officers can secretly
enter a house or office while a person is out, and investigate one's
private belongings, delaying the notice that such a measure is
being taken for as long as necessary."18 While this law is a
response to the attacks, most of its regulations are not limited to
anti-terrorist activities, but can be applied to any federal
investigation. In May 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft announced
substantial changes in domestic spying."19 The new regulation, as
in the good old days, allows the FBI to carry out surveillance of
civic, religious, and political groups in the United States.20 To this
end, it is authorized to participate covertly in religious or political
meetings, gain access to commercial databases, etc., without even
showing any suspicion of criminal activity.' 2  Some of these
activities, such as compiling information in commercial databases,
are allowed as part of an investigation already under way or just
beginning. 122 Nonetheless, the fear is that these activities can
now be used to generate (more than respond to) suspicions of
criminal activity.' 23  The report reveals just how far the
government is willing to go. Operation TIPS (Terrorism
Information and Prevention System) is the name of the initiative
to recruit one million informants in ten cities, among persons
whose everyday activities put them in touch with people in their
homes or workplaces.' 24 The informants could be the plumber, the
gas person, the telephone repairperson, the cable TV installer, the
postal carrier, and so on. 125
The LCHR report also describes the treatment accorded
immigrants, refugees, and members of minority groups. The
government closed the refugee program, deported foreigners for
minor breaches, and held many others incommunicado, in secret,
116. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
117. Id. at § 213.
118. Id.
119. A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 113, at 10-11.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 12.
125. A YEAR OF Loss, supra note 113, at 12.
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and for an undetermined time, 12 6 among other violations of
fundamental principles of international human rights law.
Hundreds were detained under such conditions. 127 The LCHR also
analyzes the detentions of United States citizens among the
government responses to the attacks, and the creation by
executive order of the infamous "military commissions. ' ' 28
E. The Dangers of the New Situation
1. Allies and Human Rights
Also in the international arena, the current administration
has demonstrated that what is important in its "endless war
against terrorism" is the ends and not the means. It doesn't
matter if the ally violates human rights systematically, represses
dissidents, or has come to power through a coup d'etat. In the
words of President Bush: "[m]y reaction about President
Musharraf [head of Pakistan's military regime], he's still tight
with us on the war against terror, and that's what I appreciate."' 29
The same can be said of other allies such as Uzbekistan, whose
government continues openly to persecute its citizens, does not
respect freedom of expression, imposes major restrictions on the
religious freedom of Muslims, convicts people in secret, practices
torture and arbitrary detentions, and maintains inhumane
prisons. 30 The United States State Department itself reports that
the arbitrary detention of Muslims is common, describes the use of
torture, and reveals that the police "plant" drugs, arms, or
religious pamphlets to justify arrests.1 3' According to Human
Rights Watch, 7,000 Muslims have been jailed arbitrarily in
Uzbekistan in recent years. 32  What matters is that this
government opened up its air space and an air base to the United
126. Id. at 13-21.
127. Id. at 15.
128. Id. at 31-33, 35-39. See also Harold Hongjuh Koh, The Case Against
Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 338-42 (2002) (arguing that
commissions violate both U.S. and international law and undermine the United
States' moral leadership).
129. Kenneth Roth, Not the Way to Fight Terrorism, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 15,
2003, at 8.
130. C.J. Chivers, Alliance With U.S. Spotlights Uzbek Rights Abuses, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at B1, B4.
131. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE: 2001 (2002), at
http://www.state.gov/gldrllrlslhrrpt2002/18400.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004)
[hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS].
132. Chivers, supra note 130, at B4.
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States, which made it an important ally in the war in
Afghanistan. 33  The same can be said of China: the Bush
administration has downplayed the importance of repression
against Muslims in the province of Xinjiang, which had been
justified by the Chinese government as part of fighting terrorism.
Similarly, violations in Saudi Arabia are ignored, as are violations
by the military forces in Indonesia. 134
2. The Repressive Example
The "new model" for war on terrorism has been extended to
many parts of the world. Many countries that abuse human rights
have received legitimacy, or have taken advantage of the situation
to restrict fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression,
privacy, and due process, and to repress minorities or dissidents.
One example can be found in the expressions of Egyptian
President Mubarak, who argued that the attacks had changed
concepts such as democracy and human rights, adding: "[t]here is
no doubt that the events of September 11 created a new concept of
democracy that differs from the concept that Western states
defended before these events, especially in regard to the freedom of
the individual."135 Commenting on the measures adopted in the
United States for fighting terrorism, President Mubarak added
that they "prove that we were right from the beginning in using all
means, including military tribunals" to combat terrorism. 136
Human Rights Watch observed that there were
"opportunistic" reactions in about fifteen countries. 137 The same
response was documented by the LCHR report. 138 It is profoundly
worrisome that many governments are citing the repressive
example of the United States to suppress public freedoms and
eliminate dissident movements in their own countries. Yet it is
much worse that the United States Secretary of State says that
Egypt is ahead of the United States in fighting terrorism and that
it is a country from which there is "much to learn" in that area."3
133. Id. at Bi.
134. Human Rights Watch, New Survey Documents Global Repression (Jan. 14,
2003), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2O03/O1/wr2OO3.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
135. A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 113, at 43.
136. Id.
137. Human Rights Watch, Opportunism in the Face of the Tragedy: Repression
in the name of Anti-terrorism, at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/septemberll/opportunismwatch.htm (last visited
Jan. 29, 2004).
138. A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 113, at 41-46.
139. Colin L. Powell & Ahmed Maher, Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L.
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3. Other Expressions of the Deterioration in the Quality of
Democracy in the United States
There are other signs that clearly show the deterioration of
the quality of democracy in the United States in key areas such as
freedom of expression, tolerance, and judicial independence, in
which the United States, could, until recently, justifiably hold
itself out as an example. With respect to freedom of expression,
the restrictions range from preventing marches against the war,
judicial decisions whose logic would have justified prohibiting the
marches led by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960s,140 to
manipulation of information by the largest news networks. 14' It
was not easy to get radio or television news on February 15, 2003,
in the United States about the massive demonstrations against
the war. These demonstrations were taking place around the
world, including in several cities of the United States. The largest
television news networks practically ignored it until a few days
later, when their coverage was tendentious, presenting the images
of the marches with titles that indicated they were making
Saddam Hussein happy.142 The Fox network labeled the huge
number of protesters in New York as "the usual protesters or
serial protesters," while the next day, the CNN web site included
the title "Antiwar Rallies Delight Iraq" while showing images of
protesters in Baghdad, but not in New York, Madrid, Rome, or
London.143
On March 15, 2003, in the city of Atlanta, there was a
demonstration to support the security of the United States and its
Powell and Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Maher after their Meeting
(Sept. 26, 2001) at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/O1092610.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2004).
140. Anthony Lewis, Marbury v. Madison v. Ashcroft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003,
at A17.
141. See Paul Krugman, Behind the Great Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at
A23, (criticizing skewed television coverage of the February 15, 2003 protest
marches).
142. Id.
143. Id. (contrasting the minimal coverage of the demonstrations of February 15,
2003 by television networks with the prominent coverage by the national-
circulation daily newspapers). Interestingly, in terms of radio broadcasting, a
major economic group, which thanks to the lifting of anti-trust prohibitions in
recent years went from owning 43 to 1,200 radio stations, was pointed out to have
organized demonstrations favoring the troops and the United States military
action, in response to the peace marches. Paul Krugman, Channels of Influence,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at A17; see John Schwartz & Geraldine Fabrikant, War
Puts Radio Giant on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at C1 (reporting on
the seemingly pro-war posture of Clear Channel and its member stations).
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troops.14 Strikingly, even though it was much smaller in numbers
than the New York demonstration against the war, television
stations featured live coverage. 145 As indicated, the United States
cable television networks appeared to be reporting what was
happening on another planet as compared to the foreign media
reports. 146 This is especially serious, since most people get their
news from the television. 147
From the outset, the television networks generally have
assumed a position clearly in favor of the "endless war on
terrorism," and when not campaigning for the war, they assume
non-critical positions on the government's actions. 14 The main
television networks increasingly base their information on
unidentified "official intelligence sources." The consequences of
ignorance and misguided patriotism entailed in this manipulation
were reflected in the growing support for the war by the people of
the United States,149 in contrast to what happened in most other
democratic countries.150
Another expression of the irresponsibility of some media is
the debate on the usefulness of or justification for torture. Some
journalists have argued the benefits of using not the instruments
of grave torture, but "something to jump-start the stalled
investigation of the greatest crime in American history,"'' s such as
having the judicial authorities administer sodium pentothal.'52
Others have come out squarely in favor of its use: "torture is bad
[but] some things are worse. And under certain circumstances, it
may be the lesser of two evils.""3  For the human rights
movement, this presents a dilemma: we accepted the debate, but
at the same time that very debate can uphold torture as a possible
144. Jennifer Brett, Speaking Out About An Iraq War: Thousands In Atlanta
Rally for U.S. Troops, Bush, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 16, 2003, at 19A.
145. Id.; CNN Saturday Morning News (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 15,
2003).
146. Krugman, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, More Americans Now Faulting U.N. on
Iraq, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at Al (reporting an increase in the
percentage of people in the United States who support of going to war with Iraq).
150. Joe Humphreys, Global Poll Shows Half Oppose War, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 15,
2003, at 7 (reporting that majorities in most democratic countries surveyed opposed
the Iraq war).
151. Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps Into Discussion By News Media, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2001, at C1.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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course of action, and may begin to legitimize its use.
154
One might conclude that the government is not fostering this
debate openly. Nonetheless, on December 26, 2002, the
Washington Post ran an article reporting that Al-Qaeda detainees
had been tortured or abused under United States custody in
Afghanistan, while others had been taken to certain countries
knowing that they might be tortured there. 155  Since its
publication, no United States authority has refuted this
information or announced corrective measures. 56
There are many other expressions of the current Bush
administration that show a rapid decline in the quality of
democracy in the United States. 57 Many of the restrictions on
fundamental liberties mentioned are being challenged by human
rights organizations in the courts, 58 while the Department of
Justice takes great pains to shield administrative action from
judicial scrutiny. 59 These judicial battles are just beginning, and
154. Id. See Peter Maas, Ifa Terror Suspect Won't Talk, Should He Be Made to?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 4; Don Van Natta Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects in
a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at Al.
155. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al. It is the authors' opinion that
Justice Department lawyers have unofficially contended that the practice of
transferring prisoners is legal, as recalled by the authors from the remarks of John
Yoo and Steve Jacobs at the Symposium on the Changing Laws of War held at
Notre Dame Law School on December 4, 2003.
156. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, to
Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State (Feb. 3, 2003), available at
http:/fhrw.org/press/2003/02/powell-ItrO20303.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
157. See, e.g., Ruth Holladay, FBI's Surveillance in Bloomington Stirs Big
Brother Fears, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1B (reporting the
implementation at Indiana University of a policy adopted after September llth to
use the FBI to track and investigate foreign professors and students); Dan Eggen,
FBI Taps Campus Police in Anti-Terror Operations, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2003, at
Al (reporting the FBI's use of campus police to further the policy of tracking and
investigating foreign professors and students).
158. See Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11
Detainees, 14 HuM. RTS. WATCH 4(G) (2002), available at
www.hrw.org/reports/2002/US911/ (detailing a number of challenges to INS
detention practices and other policies by groups such as Human Rights Watch and
the ACLU).
159. See INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N OF HUM. RTS., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT ch. 3,
78, (2003) http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2O02eng/chap.3g.htm. See also Response
of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures-Detainees in
Guantanomo Bay, Cuba, 41 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1015 (2002) (requesting that
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights rescind its request for
precautionary measures to protect detainees in Guantdnomo Bay, on the grounds
that no precautions are required or needed and that the commission has no
authority to request them); see generally supra note 158 (discussing the
Department of Justice's focus on secrecy and its arguments against judicial review
of wartime administration actions).
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the lawyers challenging the Administration obtained a major
breakthrough when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of
a group of Kuwaitis, two British, and two Australian citizens held
for a year and a half without charges in Guantdnamo Bay. 160
More broadly, the attempt to push through judicial
appointees with a strong ideological agenda is a worrisome, though
not a new, development. 161 These actions constitute an attack on
the independence of the judiciary and could also have a negative
imitation effect in other countries with less of a tradition for
separation of powers. A tendency to revert decades-old protections
for civil rights (for example with respect to constitutional
guarantees in criminal procedure, immigration, non-
discrimination, and women's rights) is precisely what is intended,
and that too is a bad example to set for other countries.
II. Conditions for the Success of the Policy of Promoting
Human Rights as Part of United States Foreign Policy
Thus far we have pointed out some of the more worrisome
expressions of the human rights policy of the current United
States administration. They contrast sharply with what Harold
Koh, 162 in a recent essay, describes as the four principles that
should guide United States human rights foreign policy in this
century: (1) tell the truth; (2) promote justice; (3) make a
commitment, internationally and domestically, for governments
and private sectors to improve the human rights situation; and (4)
use strategies of prevention: early warning, preventive diplomacy,
160. The Court and Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at A20; Linda
Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case of Detainees at Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 2003, at Al.
161. See Remarks of President Bush in Weekly Radio Address (Feb. 22, 2003)
(calling for Senate confirmation of judicial nominees including controversial
nominee Miguel Estrada) at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030222-1.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2004); see also Neil A. Lewis, Bush Seats Judge After Long Fight, Bypassing
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at Al (reporting Bush's seating of controversial
judge Charles Pickering during a congressional recess); A Judicial End Run, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A14 (criticizing Bush's seating of Charles Pickering); Neil
A. Lewis, Judicial Nominee Gets A Rare Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003,
at A24 (reporting on the second hearing of a socially conservative Bush nominee by
the Republican controlled judiciary committee); Hold Firm on Estrada, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2002, at A26 (discouraging the Senate from confirming Estrada because of
questions about his positions on key social and constitutional issues); Adam Cohen,
Deborah Cook is Typical Bush Nominee-So Watch Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003,
at A28 (pointing out radically pro-business positions of a Bush nominee).
162. See Harold Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century,
46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293, 294 (2002) (noting Harold Koh was the Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Labor in the second Clinton term).
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and democracy promotion.163
This is not the place to discuss Koh's thoughts at length, yet
it is appropriate to take up some of his principles, not only because
he is one of the leading thinkers in the field of human rights law in
the United States, but also because his ideas at least nominally
reflect official policy at his former post at the State Department. 164
Based on those guiding principles, Koh outlined some ideas on the
attributes a United States human rights foreign policy would need
in order to be successful.16 5
We agree that that the first and most important task of the
United States is to tell the truth about the human rights situation
in the world, however painful and unwelcome it may be.
Nonetheless, it is not enough to tell the truth about human rights
in other countries; it is equally important to tell the truth about
the situation in the United States, especially in those areas where
national practices fall below international standards.66 This task
is especially important at this time, when the truth should be told
about human rights violations, no matter who commits them, be
they terrorists, allies, or state agents.' 67
It is not enough to have a human rights policy as part of
United States foreign policy; it is imperative that promotion and
protection of human rights occupy a position of centrality in the
overall scheme of United States interests abroad. This means that
one should promote or defend a human rights policy even when it
endangers other interests in international politics. The human
rights policy should not be used when convenient to do so and set
aside when it clashes with other "more important" national
interests, in a sort of manipulation that does not go unnoticed,
particularly by the human rights movement, which is well trained
in and sensitive to such games.
Another requirement, difficult to find in the history of the
163. Id. at 306-330.
164. See COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 131, at xii-xv; see also U.S. State
Department, Human Rights Policy Statement of State Department's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, at http://www.state.gov/g/drllhr (last visited
Feb. 1, 2004) (stating that the fundamental principles of the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor are: (1) to strive to learn the truth and state the facts; (2)
to take consistent positions concerning past, present, and future abuses
(accountability for past abuses, strategies for internal-external commitment to halt
present abuses, and to prevent future abuses by the use of early warning strategies
and preventive diplomacy); and (3) to forge and maintain partnerships with
organizations, governments, and multilateral institutions).
165. Koh, supra note 162, at 306-44.
166. Id. at 309.
167. Id. at 343.
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United States foreign policy on human rights, is consistency.16
Consistency requires calling human rights violations by their
name independent of who commits them. In addition, consistency
is required in meting out awards and punishments in foreign
policy, and in forming alliances.
Finally, preaching by example: A large part of world public
opinion and the human rights movement reject what they call the
"double standard" employed by the United States.169 The United
States highlights everyone else's domestic problems and preaches
"what they should do" while doing nothing to improve its own
domestic situation, or, worse still, maintaining a hostile or
hypocritical attitude towards international human rights law.170
To win respect based on example one must begin by what may be
rarest among attitudes of the United States' foreign policy
establishment, self-criticism.171 If, as the State Department
affirms, there is an interest in telling the truth and being
consistent with the past, the present, and the future,72 there is no
option other than to begin with self-criticism.
These principles would confer legitimacy and credibility on
American human rights policy and no doubt the United States
would regain a position of leadership in affirming fundamental
liberties in the world. Nonetheless, it seems unthinkable that
these principles can be attained today or in the near future. There
is great distrust of the United States abroad, where few believe
that the war on terrorism has the objective of promoting "enduring
freedom." It is not the Taliban or an Iraqi soldier who points out
that "[tlo be sure, in defending its interests a great nation may end
up promoting freedom. Such was the situation with the
concentration camps. It will not be the case for the $15 barrel of
crude."'7 3  Nor is it enemy propaganda that points out the
problems of the current administration:
As the justifications for invading Iraq come and go--Saddam
is developing nuclear weapons; no, but he's in league with
Osama; no, but he's really evil-the case for war has come
168. Id. at 295.
169. See Harold Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1486-
87 (2003) (describing and criticizing double standards in U.S. policy).
170. Id.
171. See Mark Gibney & David Warner, What Does it Mean to Say I'm Sorry?
President Clinton's Apology to Guatemala and its Significance for International and
Domestic Law, 28 DEN. J. INT'L. & POL'Y. 223 (2000) (commenting on an example of
self criticism, President Clinton's apology for the role of the United States in
supporting the Guatemalan military during the Guatemalan civil war).
172. Supra note 164 and accompanying text.
173. R~gis Debray, The French Lesson, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 4, at 11.
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increasingly to rest on credibility .... But credibility ... [is]
about honoring promises, and telling the truth .... Can we
run a foreign policy in the absence of trust? The
administration apparently thinks it can use threats as a
substitute.74
It cannot be said that the current foreign policy has yielded
no results; it has, and immediately. The perception that the truth
is not being told, that the administration is not being honest, and
that it is being arrogant, has wrought a change worldwide that
was unthinkable two years ago: there has been a swing from
widespread solidarity with the United States to strong anti-
American sentiment. 75 Recent polls in democratic countries show
that for their citizens, the main threat to world peace is not Iraq or
North Korea, but the United States.7 6
III. The Shortcomings of the Human Rights Movement
A. The Debate on the Relevance or Obsolescence of Human
Rights
Almost immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the opinion began to circulate on the need to think of international
law in terms that did not limit the tools societies need to defend
themselves from terrorism. Of course, the argument that human
rights only "tie the hands" of the guardians of order is well-known
in the developing world. As this kind of thinking is brandished
mainly by those who violate human rights and at the same time
are often incapable of giving citizens security, it is not very
persuasive.177  Nonetheless, in the spheres of international
relations and in the cities of the developed world, this position had
not been put forth before September 11, 2001 and the reality of the
insecurity one experiences in New York and European capitals
gives this argument some appearance of credibility and
persuasiveness that cannot be overlooked. It may be common to
hear after September 11, 2001 that "we are all Israeli," in the
174. Paul Krugman, Threats, Promises and Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at
A29.
175. See Jane Perlez, Americans Abroad Find Anger at U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2003, at Al (discussing how Americans abroad coped with anti-U.S. sentiment).
176. See Nicholas Kristof, Flogging the French, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A29
(discussing a survey from the European edition of Time where 84% of the 318,000
persons surveyed thought the United States was the main threat to world peace);
The Tune Changes-a bit, ECONOMIST 22 Feb. 2003, at 47 (discussing a survey
showing that 74% of Germans believe that the United States has "too much power"
and is a greater threat to world peace than Iraq or North Korea).
177. Supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
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sense that we understand what it is to live under the constant
threat of terrorism. From there it is just a few steps to offering
justifications for suppressing freedoms, making the prohibition on
torture as a method of interrogation less than absolute, and giving
free rein to the security forces.178 It is argued that international
human rights treaties are not a "suicide pact."'179
Of course the discourse is more complicated and subtle, and
has nuances that cannot be adequately captured in these lines. At
the risk of oversimplifying, however, we can summarize the most
sharply opposing positions as follows: on the one hand, it is said
that the norms of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law still apply to the situations for
which they were conceived. Nonetheless, the struggle against
terrorism is a new arena and was not contemplated in those
instruments. s0  Terrorism with international connections,
operating transnationally, is radically different from the criminal
or insurgent phenomena carried out within the confines of a
state. 81 And the war on terrorism is not a conventional war, with
armies confronting one another in the battlefield and with
identifiable uniforms and badges. In the face of this situation,
insisting on meticulous compliance with each and every norm of
both bodies of law ignores the new realities and exigencies of
security. As the new situation that it is, over time the war on
terrorism will generate its own set of rules, which will eventually
arise from the concrete practice of states. In the meantime, one
must think through those practices without being tied down by
norms designed for other situations."2
On the other hand, human rights and humanitarian
organizations answer that international human rights law and
international humanitarian law are complete bodies of law and
that they do consider many different situations, including the
possibility of suspending guarantees in times of emergency. 8 3 The
178. Supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
179. David Martin, a law professor at the University of Virginia who is generally
supportive of the Bush administration on these issues, said that human rights
obligations are not a "suicide pact" at a hearing of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, on State responses to terrorism, held in March 2002, when
author Juan M6ndez was presiding. See Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, IACHR Concludes its 114th Regular Session (Mar. 15, 2002) at
http://www.cidh.oas.org.
180. Sources cited supra note 45 and accompanying text.
181. Supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
182. Carleton & Stohl, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
183. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 4,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); American Convention on
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terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York have not
changed the nature, force, or applicability of the international
obligations of states with respect to human rights and the rules of
armed conflict, obligations that must be respected with or without
a terrorist threat. The same is stated with respect to the norms of
public international law on the legitimate use of force in
international relations.
The second position is closer to our ideas, for we do not
believe that international law, in its current form, contains any
vacuum. We cannot fail to note, however, that firmly embracing
that position without concessions poses major risks. To argue that
nothing has changed since September lth clashes with people's
perceptions and intuitions, and with the insistent message of the
media, especially television.184 Accordingly, insisting on an
intransigent position in this debate may lead the human rights
movement to be marginalized and to lose influence. It is not, of
course, a question of clinging to the possibility of influencing
policy-making (which can be an illusion unless we achieve real
political weight in decision-making) by sacrificing the principles
and indeed the very identity of the human rights movement.
Organizations of civil society influence decision-making only to the
extent that they defend causes and do so consistently. When they
bend or blur the principles they defend, they fail to offer
differentiated proposals for the marketplace of ideas, and then
their loss of influence is greater still.
At the same time, it is important to analyze calmly the risks
that this debate poses for the human rights movement. It is
necessary to think through the positions to be adopted in that
debate in terms that are both immediate and strategic. One must
be willing to lose some ideological battles at this time to preserve
our capacity to exercise influence in the future, but also to figure
out how the battles we lose can be limited in number, and, to the
extent possible, not decisive.
B. Need to Enter the Debate
In view of the foregoing, we argue that the human rights
movement, objectively speaking, has no option but to enter this
debate. To be able to effectively carry out our mission of defending
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 99 (entered into
force July 18, 1978); The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and Its Eight Protocols, signed Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
184. Supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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the present and future victims of the war on terrorism, we must
strengthen our capacity to engage in dialogue with the powers that
be, and especially our chances of being heard. Accordingly,
participating in the debate cannot consist simply of repeating rigid
and intransigent positions, since by engaging in such a style of
debate we would be relegating ourselves to the margins.
Even before September 11th, some intellectuals influential in
international politics questioned the human rights movement for
what they considered its dogmatic and excessively rigid positions,
especially on issues related to the effort to get peace processes
launched and to succeed, or to so-called "humanitarian
intervention."'185 Certainly, the attention these authors lend to
positions of non-governmental human rights organizations is
witness to the movement's growing influence. Such influence may
not be great in policy-making circles, but it carries weight in
establishing ethical and legal limits to the solutions proposed by
the powers that be. That intellectuals pay attention to the human
rights movement is also a sign of the capacity acquired by some
organizations to shape worldwide public opinion. At the same
time, some of the criticism leveled at the human rights movement
is made from perspectives favorable to our principles and our
mission, with which a sort of "organic criticism" is coming about
that is also a sign of the movement's maturity and growth. In
addition, the most distinguished human rights leaders have
proven capable of using public debates to advocate the movement's
positions very effectively. 86
After September 11th, some criticism of the human rights
movement has become harsher and attacks on human rights
NGOs, mostly coming from the Bush administration and its
supporters, have increased in number. At the same time the
attacks have diminished in quality and precision. Although it may
appear that this presents an advantage to our movement, it
actually seems to us that the opposite is true: the poor quality of
the criticism is in direct proportion to the perception of the
185. See, e.g., David Rieff, The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 37 (asserting that the moral absolutism of
human rights activists is causing the movement to lose mainstream support); Brad
R. Roth, Peaceful Transitions and Retrospective Justice: Some Reservations, ETHICS
& INT'L AFF., 45 (2001) (concluding that human rights standards are not a
universal solution to resolutions of violent conflict); see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF,
HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY viii-xxviii (Amy Gutman ed., 2003)
(discussing the purposes and foundation of the human rights movement).
186. See ARYEH NEIER, TAKING LIBERTIES ix-xxxiv (2003) (providing a
chronological analysis of forty years of the human rights movement).
[Vol. 22:223
2004] PROSPECTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY 255
movement's diminished influence over the great issues of the day.
In other words, the human rights movement is criticized more
superficially because the critics believe they can ignore it. Human
rights advocates are minimized as the usual discontents who
exercise the "right to throw a temper tantrum," which is also
functional to the system, for it tends to legitimize the new
practices, based on the argument that one can freely voice one's
opinions against them. When human rights defenders begin to
make some headway in public opinion, immediately their
patriotism is called into question. 17
In this scenario, it is necessary to accompany the task of
denouncing violations with an openness to engage in dialogue.
Suppressing the debate is in the interest of the authoritarians and
prejudicial to the human rights cause. Accordingly, one must be
prepared to hear the points of view of those who affirm new
realities and new legal rules, and to address their reasoning point
by point. In addition, we should avoid the perception that we
denounce violations just for the sake of denouncing them, which
requires, in addition to publicizing and protesting violations, that
we come forth with specific and reasonable proposals. In
particular, there is a need to reflect on the question as to the
current force of human rights instruments and the laws of war in
the new scenario of the anti-terrorist effort. Although we can
definitely argue that these international obligations should
continue to apply, we must not skip the prior step of showing why
that is so and should continue to be so.
C. Starting Point: No Backsliding
It must be recognized that the struggle against terrorism can,
in certain circumstances, include approaches and actions that
were not duly contemplated in the drafting of the instruments we
apply. International human rights law addresses the guarantees
that a state must apply within its jurisdiction, in peacetime and in
emergency situations that endanger the life of the nation. s88 It
187. Hearings on Anti-Terrorism Policy before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (testimony of Attorney General John
Ashcroft) ("[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty,
my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists-for they erode our national
unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies and
pause to America's friends."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/.
188. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
4, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 99 (entered into
force July 18, 1978); The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
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generally does not contain provisions for going after transnational
crimes, or cooperation among states to repress them. Similarly,
although international humanitarian law has evolved from and
applies to international and non-international conflicts, and in the
latter recognizes some forms of irregular warfare, its norms may
be imprecise when it comes to determining when a given action is
an act of war. This is especially so in relation to transnational
terrorist networks, in which organized groups operating
clandestinely seek to sow fear among the civilian population.
Before accepting these supposed limitations of the codes we
apply, we should insist that as a matter of principle, the law does
not have gaps. It is one thing to be willing to accept the debate,
and quite another to accept a premise which, in our view, has not
been proven. For example, in terms of the supposed shortcomings
that have been pointed out, one must note that other aspects of
international law, such as the principles of extradition and
international cooperation to fight crime, and the incipient but
growing body of international treaties against terrorism, help to
fill any gap one may find., 9 In any event, one must be prepared to
unmask some of these positions for what they really are: not so
much an effort to explore the limits and failings of the current
state of international law, but an effort to re-write it to free it from
restrictions based on respect for the human dignity of every
person, including one's enemies.
In taking on this debate, we must be faithful to essential
principles of our discipline, such as the principle on the
progressive development of human rights. 19 0 We cannot proclaim
that human rights are in constant progressive evolution and at the
same time insist that they have a crystallized and permanent
content. The raison d'etre of the principle of progressive
development is precisely that the law generally, and especially
human rights law, must evolve to adapt to changing social and
human realities. At the same time, the principle of progressive
content presupposes that such adaptations occur as steps forward
and Fundamental Freedoms and Its Eight Protocols, signed Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
189. See INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N OF HUM. RTS., ORG. OF AM. STATES, REPORT
ON TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33-38 (2002) (discussing how international law
against terrorism shapes the analysis of international human rights commitments
in the context of terrorism violence).
190. Buergenthal, supra note 102, at 212. See generally PEDRO NIKKEN, INTER-
AM. INST. OF HuM. RTS., LA PRoTEccI6N INTERNACIONAL DE Los DERECHOS
HUMANOS: SU DESARROLLO PROGRESIVO (1987)
http://www.iidh.ed.cr/en-index.aspx.
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and not as regressive movement, especially in terms of
fundamental guarantees.
To this end, we must insist that terrorism be seen both in
light of its new characteristics and in terms of what is familiar and
known. The attack on the World Trade Center is a qualitative and
not just quantitative change, but the sensation of insecurity New
Yorkers feel is the same as many peoples have suffered and
continue to suffer in other parts of the world. In particular,
terrorism is a challenge to the creativity of societies and states,
and it is likely that it will result in different ways of addressing
the relationship between security and liberty. Yet it is essential
that the challenge be addressed from past experiences, not as if we
were starting from scratch.
In no case can new situations serve as an excuse for
backwards movement in the area of human rights. If there are
going to be changes in the law, we should accept and even promote
them, so long as they are steps forward that build on what is
already accepted as law. In terms of the content of the new norms,
we cannot accept standards that either abandon or weaken basic
principles that inform our discipline. As for the process of forming
new norms, it is unquestionable that in international law the
practice of states gives rise to norms that are eventually enshrined
in treaties or other instruments. In that sense, the work of the
human rights movement will consist of denouncing and criticizing
those practices that represent rolling back the current state of
human rights and international humanitarian law to prevent
acquiescence in such practices from becoming universally
applicable norms. Seen in a positive light, our contribution to
policy-making should foster those practices which, though novel,
are consistent with the effectively progressive development of
norms, and which are steps in constructing norms deserving of our
support.
IV. Prospects for Human Rights Work Abroad
We should accept that the outlook is somber for the
possibilities of effective protection of human rights from civil
society organizations and from inter- governmental agencies.
First, it is not possible to count on the pressure that the State
Department and United States Congress can bring to bear when it
comes to fostering changes in repressive policies, amplifying
condemnation of violations, or serving as a valid interlocutor vis-L-
vis authorities responsible for human rights violations. In most
cases, considerations of "realpolitik," the reluctance to criticize
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friends of the United States, or United States national security
interests will have precedence and will stand in the way of such
pronouncements or actions. 191 Even in those cases in which the
United States is favorably predisposed, its influence will be
diminished by lack of consistency and by subordination of its
human rights policy to other foreign policy or security objectives.
Indeed, in some cases the hostility of the United States will help
give certain regimes an undeserved image as victims of
imperialism, and an excuse for not improving their human rights
performance. Moreover, repressive or authoritarian governments
now have at hand a response for those who question their tactics:
if the United States does it in the war on terrorism, we can do it
too.
This doesn't mean that we should completely renounce work
in Washington on behalf of human rights in other parts of the
world. Despite all the difficulties, the very might of the United
States, the attention the world press gives to what goes on in
Washington, and the still considerable potential to generate
debates from there means it will continue to offer a propitious
forum for our protests and proposals. There will also be cases in
which the United States government is still willing to act on behalf
of human rights, and in which it can do so with prospects for
success. Those opportunities should not be disdained, though it
will always be important to preserve the independence of human
rights organizations and their role as a critical conscience vis-i-vis
all the powers that be.
At this juncture, the multilateral scenarios, both political-
diplomatic bodies and the universal and regional organs of
protection, assume greater importance as a forum for human
rights.192 Strictly speaking, for some time now the center of
gravity of the international work has shifted to multilateral fora.
This has happened, first of all, because the electoral regimes that
have replaced many dictatorships are more susceptible to
expressions of concern made in assemblies in which they feel they
are "among their peers."'' 9 Second, the United States has
considerably reduced its interest in Latin America and other
regions for several years now. 194 In any event, the importance of
191. Mayerfeld, supra note 87, at 95 and accompanying text.
192. It should be acknowledged, however, that the multilateral fora are not free
from the negative influence of unipolarity and exceptionality that we noted above.
193. This reflects, for example, the authors' experiences working with the
Organization of American States.
194. See Jorge Castafieda, The Forgotten Relationship, FOREIGN AFF., May-June
2003, at 67 (discussing lack of involvement of the United States in Latin America
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the multilateral initiatives will be accentuated, since the
governments of small and weak nations feel more protected from
United States pressures in multilateral bodies.
The work in multilateral organizations is frequently done
through the governments that constitute them; accordingly, it will
always be necessary to keep open the doors of dialogue with the
State Department. At the same time, it is advisable to think of
strategies for approaching the representatives of the other
democracies. Whether those democracies have a tradition of
engaging NGOs in dialogue or not, recent examples of fruitful
relations in this area are initially encouraging.
In order to be able to generate human rights based foreign
policy initiatives by old and new democracies, it will be necessary
to insist on dialogue not only with international NGOs, but also
with the civil society of each country. Unfortunately, the
acceptance by the foreign ministries of the national NGOs as valid
interlocutors is one of the aspects on which the least progress has
been made since the beginning of the most recent transition to
democracy. Even so, it is essential to continue making efforts
along these lines. In addition, the human rights movement should
generate ideas and proposals for two or more governments of each
region to coordinate their policies on certain specific human rights
problems, and implement them through joint multilateral
initiatives.
A second aspect of the multilateral strategy refers to the
action of the organs of protection, especially the regional ones,
which enjoy growing legitimacy and prestige. A well thought out
strategy should include the systematic use of the mechanisms of
protection and promotion that they offer. In particular, it will be
important to diversify the case law of the organs of protection by
presenting novel cases and problems not yet sufficiently addressed
by international law. One risk that is to be avoided is to demand
that these organs provide responses to national or international
problems that they are not in a position to give, either because of
the limits to their jurisdiction or because of the relative political
weight of their decisions. The strategy of bringing new cases
should consider that the best outcome of the involvement of the
international supervisory organs is feedback that bolsters national
capacities to solve human rights violations. Accordingly,
simultaneous with the presentation of cases, it is necessary to
think of how interpretations rendered by the international organs
after the September 11th attacks).
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through their decisions will be incorporated into domestic law.
We should be realistic and recognize that the organs of
protection do not have their own means to enforce their decisions.
Therefore, their efficacy will also depend on the political will of the
states, both the state directly affected by the decision, and all
other state parties, which should assume the obligation of
collectively guaranteeing the implementation of human rights
obligations. With or without diversifying strategies, the tasks of
human rights will always have to include a dialogue with the
states to persuade them to comply in their own cases, and to
incorporate concern for human rights in other countries into their
foreign policy.
It is worth inquiring into whether it will be possible to
replace, albeit partially, the influence of the United States as a
tool for protecting and promoting human rights in our countries by
the influence of other democratic governments and centers of
power. The resistance of several European countries to the
pressure of the United States on the Security Council in relation to
the use of force against Iraq leads us to think that it is possible to
conceive of a democratic power that tends to strike a balance with
United States unilateralism. If this is indeed so, perhaps it is not
illusory to think that such force, exercised today as a check on
military adventure, could eventually be used positively to solve
human rights problems in developing countries. Some time ago the
members of the European Union made it explicit that human
rights are part of the vital core of their common foreign policy;19 5
accordingly, such a presence in the world would appear to have
specific political and historical precedent. To date, however, that
human rights policy clearly has not been as visible or effective as
we would have liked, for a variety of reasons that are beyond the
scope of this essay. Now, the sudden understanding of the need
for balance in the unipolar world we live in may result in an
advantageous diversification of factors of power and influence, so
as to replace the ways in which the international human rights
movement has been doing its work.
As in earlier stages, public opinion will continue to be of
strategic importance to the human rights movement. Human
rights defenders will be all the more effective in their struggle
insofar as they can become true shapers of opinion. "World public
195. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, Dec. 24,
2002, Official Journal of the European Communities C325, art. 11.1 (stating that
one of the objectives of the European Union is to develop respect for human rights),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_consul.pdf.
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opinion" is becoming the second great power and the only one
capable of balancing the weight of the sole remaining super-
power. 96  Recent events indicate that mobilization and the
decision to gain the streets are more relevant today than some of
us had assumed. 97 Fortunately, many human rights organizations
have a lengthy tradition of grassroots mobilization as a tactic for
disseminating their mission. Although that may mean that our
efforts have to continue to be aimed at shaping opinion by
mobilizing, it will be important to understand the limits of this
tactic if we are to use it prudently and at the most opportune times
and places.
Shaping opinion requires not only being right, but being
capable of disseminating a message with both ethical and
programmatic content. To this end, one must be willing to answer,
one by one, the positions that are at odds with the doctrine of
human rights, using rational arguments that are principled and
pragmatic at the same time. Language plays a key role here. It
will not be enough to proclaim ourselves human rights activists for
majority opinion to go along with us. It will depend on our ability
to intervene when we have something to say, to offer responses
that are not predictable, and to develop a systematic effort to gain
access to the media. As in all policy-making areas, media access is
not limited to being cited frequently in large circulation daily
newspapers; even more important is that our information and
opinions appear in outlets that help shape the opinions of decision
makers.
Independent of the tactics and strategies we choose, the most
effective thing we can do is to ensure coordination and a sound
division of labor among the various organizations that make up
the movement. Such coordination should not be limited to the
action of any one organization, but should pursue the objective of
maximizing the impact of each. Fortunately, despite some
obstacles along these lines, the human rights movement has
shown signs of a sound capacity to work in a coordinated manner
at various levels.
One final consideration is necessary when speaking of future
tasks. The movement should avoid by all means being cornered in
196. Jos6 Zalaquett, Address at the Seminar on the Implementation of
International Human Rights Obligations and Standards Organized by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the International Justice Center
(Mar. 1, 2003).
197. See Robert D. McFadden, From New York to Melbourne, Cries for Peace,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, § 1 (Magazine), at 1 (discussing global protests against
the war with Iraq).
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the political debate, characterized by knee-jerk opposition to the
actions of the powerful. It is already quite difficult to distinguish
our opposition to the over-simplistic recourse to force from our
positions on the human rights performance of the regimes against
which such force is sought to be applied. For us, it is clear that
Saddam Hussein and the Taliban cannot be defended from the
perspective of human rights. Nonetheless, it is difficult to get
away from the false accusation that we defend those regimes when
we oppose the use of force against them.
Related to the foregoing is the issue of the legitimate use of
force. As stated above, international law has precise norms on this
key issue in international relations. 198 Until the 1990s, the human
rights organizations did not have to address this issue, but the
cases of genocide forced a discussion on the topic. 199 Clearly, this
essay will not attempt to resolve the highly complex dilemma of
when and under what conditions the movement should come out in
favor of the use of force. Yet it is necessary to be aware that the
dilemma will come up again and again. The fact that one or more
organizations favor the use of force under certain circumstances
(jus ad bellum) is not tantamount to renouncing the monitoring of
possible violations of international humanitarian law (jus in bello).
The problem is not so much one of taking a position when what is
at stake is saving thousands of lives, but of being able to
distinguish human rights violations as grounds for military
intervention from their use as a pretext for, or to give legitimacy
to, interventions that are clearly carried out for other reasons.
Some organizations will prefer always to assume a pacifist
position, opposing the use of force under any circumstance. Others
will prefer not to have to take a position, limiting themselves
instead to monitoring the observance of the laws of war. Finally,
there will be those who recognize the need to join their voices,
accompanied by good information and analysis, to measured uses
198. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2.3, 2.4, 39, 42, 48, 50, 51; supra notes 189-189 and
accompanying text.
199. See Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of
"Humanitarian Intervention," 93 A.J.I.L. 824, 825-26 (1999) (discussing whether
NATO's military intervention in Kosovo was justified); Thomas M. Frank, Lessons
from Kosovo, 93 A.J.I.L. 857, 858-59 (1999) (discussing the lessons learned form the
NATO intervention in Kosovo). Just as an additional example, Human Rights
Watch does not make judgments about the decision whether to go to war, about
whether a war complies with international law, but it has made exceptions to its
neutrality in cases of needed humanitarian intervention. Human Rights Watch:
Current Events, Human Rights Watch Policy on Iraq (explaining Human Rights
Watch's policy of publicly advocating for military intervention to avoid genocide or
massive loss of life, as in Somalia in 1992, Bosnia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, and so
on) at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/iraq/hrwpolicy.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
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of force to save lives after exhausting all other possibilities.
Perhaps the best thing is to maintain this plurality of visions on
the issue, but in this essay we simply wish to say that it is
important to maintain a serious and reflexive discussion on this
point within the human rights movement.
Conclusion
The events of September 11, 2001, do not change the
meaning or importance of the mission of the human rights
movement in the world. Rather, they ratify the importance of
insisting, if appropriate, with greater urgency, on respect for the
fundamental principles that guide us, especially against the
temptation of exceptionalism. Yet the new international situation
created in the wake of these events presents us with important
challenges that will test our ability to impact decisions. To get
past the difficulties we face, we are well armed with our
experience of recent years, and with our ability to influence
consciences across nationalities and cultures. Nonetheless, it will
be necessary to be creative in insisting on our principles and
adapting them to new realities, without falling into mechanical
repetition and without being marginalized and rendered obsolete.
This Essay has emphasized the role of the United States
government as an important actor in promoting and protecting
human rights, both in favor of and against these tasks, reflecting
our view of the historical importance for the movement of having
human rights as an explicit objective of United States foreign
policy since the 1970s. This does not mean that we think that the
tasks of human rights are limited to lobbying various institutions
in Washington, or that the fate of the movement depends on the
degree to which the United States government is receptive or
hostile to us. Rather, it means that the new United States policy
towards the rest of the world raises serious questions as to how to
relate to an actor which to date had played a very important role
in our mission. In addition, it makes all the more urgent the task
of seeking new points of support for the movement; this is a
strategic process of reflection that merits much more rigorous and
concerted treatment.
